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Book Reviews
War & Strategy
Rebooting Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century
By Christopher Coker
Reviewed by Dale C. Eikmeier, Assistant Professor, US Army Command and
Staff College

C

arl von Clausewitz’s On War may look more impressive on our
bookshelves, but Christopher Coker’s Rebooting Clausewitz ‘On
War’ in the 21st Century will be more useful. Coker argues forcefully that
Clausewitz is not only relevant in the twenty-first century but still the
world’s greatest war theorist, and those interested in the study of war
still need to understand his work. Coker believes that by “rebooting”
Clausewitz, his greatness as a theorist can be better recognized and
more fully understood. Just as modern physicists do not read Sir Isaac
Newton but also still know and understand his laws and principles,
military professionals and civilian members of the defense community,
need not wade through On War but must also understand Clausewitz’s
theory of war.
To be clear, Coker is not advocating ignoring On War. He believes On
War is the most complete text on the phenomenon of war. And despite
the criticisms of Basil Liddell Hart, Martin van Creveld, John
Keegan, and others, Coker argues Clausewitz is still unsurpassed.
Admittedly On War is a “dense philosophical forest that few of us have
the ability or inclination to navigate alone” (prologue). Herein lies the
contribution of Coker’s work. Military professionals, and war theory
instructors, now have a guide and do not need to navigate the
Clausewitzian forest.
Coker’s work brings Clausewitz to life for a student audience. And let’s
face it, when it comes to understanding Clausewitz, we are all students.
Coker departs from the traditional scholarly approach to Clausewitz
and uses a series of fictional seminar discussions between Clausewitz
and modern audiences. This is where he takes risks, but it is also the
strength of his book. The idea is to reach military and security
professionals that run from anything Clausewitz. The result is a
well-researched, well-sourced, highly informative, yet entertaining
analysis and explanation of Clausewitz’s theories applied to the
contemporary environment.
The first fictional seminar is with cadets at the US Military Academy.
The venue is deliberate. Coker and his fictional, albeit accurately sourced,
Clausewitz admit that On War was for senior military members and
policymakers, and thus too advanced for cadets with little contextual
experience to appreciate it. However, Coker believes the foundation
for understanding Clausewitz’s theories needs to be set early, hence the
cadet forum. The West Point discussion lays out the basics required
for understanding On War. The discussion covers what is theory, the
why and how of theory, and finally, what theory achieved. The cadets’
questions place Clausewitz’s theories in the current era with Clausewitz
attempting to answer and reconcile his nineteenth-century experience
with the twenty-first century. With the instructor as moderator, and
linking the cadets’ modern worldview with Clausewitz’s explanations, he
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addresses many modern criticisms. The seminar-formatted discussion
demonstrates the continued relevance of Clausewitz in the modern era.
The next seminar, takes place in a fictional Washington, DC, think
tank in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Participants include
Clausewitz, a journalist, a national security scholar and author, and a
retired Marine Corps general. This panel represents many of the current
critiques against Clausewitz and modern war. Topics include strategy,
political purpose and its role in strategic planning, intelligence, the fog
of war, and of course, the center of gravity. Even modern concepts such
as the revolution in military affairs and “shock and awe” make cameo
appearances. Many readers will find this section the most relevant as
it explores the enduring qualities of Clausewitz’s nineteenth-century
theories against twenty-first century realities.
The final seminar, at the Military History Circle in London, focuses
on the value of military history. According to Coker, Clausewitz used
history to backup ideas with illustrative examples, ground theory in
experience, illustrate a theory’s possible truth, and prove a theoretical
proposition. The discussion, more accurately described as an interrogation of Clausewitz, covers diverse subjects such as Newtonian
and quantum physics, causality, mathematical predictions, the role
of technology, and moral content. In these discussions, Clausewitz
rebuts, explains, corrects, or accepts the validity of the criticisms, and
thus provides the reader a point-by-point analysis of many modern
critiques of Clausewitz.
Coker departs from the fictional seminar format in the chapter
“What if Clausewitz Had Read Darwin.” Here he adds balance by
acknowledging Clausewitz’s shortcomings and failings. Coker claims
Clausewitz’s theories may be illuminating, but not illuminating enough,
because the objectives were too ambitious and at the same time too
modest. To address these shortcomings, Coker “sticks his neck out”
and “reboots” Clausewitz through the lens of Darwinism. This section
is Coker’s most significant and original contribution to both war theory
and the study of Clausewitz. Coker postulates that had Clausewitz
read Darwin (which was published 36 years after Clausewitz’s death),
he might have asked different questions on the nature of war. Coker
applies Clausewitz to the Darwinian framework of origins, mechanisms,
ontogeny, and functions, identifying where Clausewitz is silent and
where he contributes to the body of knowledge.
Coker concludes with a chapter titled “If Not Clausewitz, Then
Who?” The only other candidates, according to Coker, that address
the theory are Sun Tzu and Thucydides. He describes Sun Tzu’s work
as a list of aphorisms divorced from context while Thucydides was an
historian, not a theorist, who raised questions without answering them.
For these reasons, Clausewitz is the gold standard On War theory which,
if not read, should at least be understood.
Coker’s fictional seminars and analysis give nineteenth-century
theory twenty-first century legs. Thus Rebooting Clausewitz is not only
a useful guide for both novice and experienced scholars but also an
essential companion to On War. While On War may rest on the bookshelf,
Rebooting will likely be on the desktop, dog-eared and tabbed.
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On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle
By B. A. Friedman
Reviewed by William F. Owen, Co-founder and Vice President of IJ Infinity Group

B

ottom line up front, you should read this book. That said, while I
do recommend it, it is not without some serious issues.
The book is an attempt to construct a theory of tactics. The author
justifies this ambitious goal on the basis that this has not been done to
date. He simply states, “There has never been a true tactical theorist” (1).
That might be correct, and possibly for a very good reason, but it would
also be fair to state that many people have written very insightfully and
usefully about tactics.
What is good, and possibly excellent, is that the author understands
well enough, and advocates for, an understanding of tactics based in their
utility to strategy and thus policy. He does so from the strategic theory
primarily provided by Clausewitz. In that regard, and in my opinion,
he cannot be faulted. This alone makes the work a notable and worthy
addition to the library. Thus the basic argument of the book is that
strategy can only be done as tactics, and tactics needs a body of theory
as rigorous and useful as that which Clausewitz provided for strategy.
He then goes on to provide a series of tenets, not principles, which
should provide the basis of a theory of tactics. These tenets are grouped
into JFC Fuller’s framework of moral, mental, and physical categories.
Any British officer will know these categories have long formed the
United Kingdom’s definition of combat power expressed as conceptual,
physical, and moral. It is noteworthy that combat power is not tactics in
the British framework.
This is where the problems begin because the author never explains
how and why he made the choices he did, and he makes some extremely
odd choices. For example, why Fuller? Fuller’s theoretical body of work
is far from infallible, and its utility is much debated. This might be said
to be a matter of opinion, but Fuller is far more widely criticized and his
ideas are far less certain than some imagine. In the case of conceptual,
moral, and physical, the physical presides over all else. Ask any logistician.
Sadly, the book is devoid of any real discussion of logistics.
While the author cites Foch’s 1903 Principles of War there is no
discussion of the core functions—surely one of the most widely used
tactical frameworks Foch ever developed and discussed as a campaign
planning tool linking strategy with tactics in one coherent form. Foch
is also absent from the discussions on so-called mission command and
attack by infiltration all of which were featured in this 1903 work.
While On Tactics champions the human element of war, Jim Storr’s
Human Face of War is cited exactly once despite being directly relevant
to almost everything the author has to say, especially when it comes to
firepower, maneuver, shock, and surprise. Friedman may wish to assert
there are no true tactical theorists, but Jim Storr is about as close as you
can get, and his work also notably addresses and discusses items such as
the core functions plus a great deal more relevant to tactics.

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2017
256 pages
$29.95

TOC

126

Parameters 47(4) Winter 2017–18

Robert Leonhard’s work The Principles of War for the Information Age,
and his wider body of work, is far too summarily dismissed despite its
wealth of relevance to what the author is trying to say and its provision of
excellent conceptual frameworks that would have served this work well.
Hans Delbrück’s Clausewitz conjecture, which is critical to
connecting strategy with tactics, is wrongly cited. He never mentions
Clausewitz and is relegated to a section on counterinsurgency instead
of being central to what Friedman says about strategy having to serve
tactics. The author simply seems unaware of this fairly major point.
The main problem with this work is that the author is, either by
accident or design, clearly intent on not being seen as standing on the
shoulders of those who have tackled the subject before him even when
they have skillfully and comprehensively presented many of the points
he wishes to make.
This should not detract from the basic utility of the book, but tactics
is not a little known subject. What creates “victory” is a vast field of
literature. It is a practical skill presided over by considerable physical
limitations, and there is a massive body of literature which covers it,
some risibly poor but some excellent and useful.
As strategy can only be done as tactics (ends and means) the true
results of tactics lie in their effect on policy. That said, there is no
worthwhile discussion on rules of engagement whose sole purpose it is
to align tactics with policy (means with ends), which is the very point the
author wants to champion. Given their centrality to modern operations,
this is another odd choice.
Despite all my criticism, very little—or nothing—in the book is
actually incorrect or misleading. Most of the major problems are those
of omission that would have served the writer’s wider cause.
On Tactics contains some excellent sections, and truly insightful
observations, most of which will be obvious to most readers. On Tactics
addresses a number of issues with precision and skill and says much that
practitioners can agree with. If you are new to the subject, then you will
be provided with a strong starting point that is unlikely to set you on the
wrong path. On Tactics more than passes the mark for making soldiers
curious about their profession and should be read by all those who are.

Clausewitz
By Bruno Colson
Reviewed by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Visiting Professor, US Army War College

A
Paris: Perrin, 2016
513 pages (in French)
€27.00

t the very end of absorbing the new biography of Carl von
Clausewitz, Bruno Colson cites the great French philosopher Rene
Girard. For Girard, the Prussian military theorist’s seminal treatise On War
allows the French to see their history and national hero Napoleon through
different eyes (391). The same could be said for Colson’s book. While
written in French and primarily intended for a Francophone audience,
this biography enables a wider circle of readers to see Clausewitz not just
as the Prussian officer and the German patriot, as he is often portrayed.
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From the pages of Colson’s book, Causewitz emerges as a man
who wrote in German but whose mindset radically transcended his
homeland’s physical and intellectual borders. He was edified by the
great promises of the Enlightenment and often clashed with the world
shaped by the French Revolution. Despite his deep personal resentments
against Napoleonic France, he advocated moderation after its defeat,
for he understood the political necessity of winning the peace. This
ability to see the world and war in complex and global contexts, beyond
a narrow national, militaristic, and momentary framework, transformed
Clausewitz from a Prussian officer into one of the West’s most influential
strategic thinkers.
Bruno Colson, a professor at the Universite de Namur (Belgium), is
also the author of Napoleon On War, a comprehensive collection of texts
and authenticated quotes by Napoleon on his vision of war, published in
English in 2015. In it, Colson built upon the framework of Clausewitz’s
seminal treatise to organize Napoleon’s ideas, and accordingly invited
comparison between the two.
Scholars often study Clausewitz’s life solely as the blueprint for
On War. Colson writes mostly about the man, and while discussing
Clausewitz’s prolific oeuvre, he trusts readers to make connections and
form conclusions. As a military historian, Colson is at his best when he
describes the battles Clausewitz participated in and analyses his possible
role and contributions. The chapter devoted to his time as a prisoner of
war in France, “A Bildungsreise in the Enemy’s Country,” reveals many
new details, as the French police kept the foreign officers under close
surveillance and the records are still preserved. Napoleon personally
read the reports and often left delightful comments about these, in
his words, officiers fanfarons (braggarts), although regretfully he never
mentioned Clausewitz by name (89).
In 1815, by Waterloo, while the Duke of Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch
Army and the rest of the Prussian Army fought against Napoleon, the
Prussian III Corps held Marshall Emmanuel de Grouchy by Wavre. The
decision to retreat in the face of an enemy twice as strong would darken
the image of Clausewitz, chief of staff of the III Corps, in the times of the
buoyant German Empire and militaristic Third Reich. While devoid of
glory, this was nevertheless the prudent course of action, for it preserved
his men’s lives, especially since the main battle was already won. Hard
choices like these, Colson argues, make Clausewitz appear modern and
close to our understanding about what war is fought for (385).
Contrary to popular modern academic assertions, Colson disputes
the notion that a sudden crisis occurred in Clausewitz’s thinking around
1827, causing him to rethink and rewrite his seminal theory. Famously in
the note of July 10, 1827, published as a preface of On War, the military
theorist asserted there were two types of war: one with the objective to
overthrow the enemy and “render him politically helpless” and the other
with limited objectives, such as forcing the enemy to the negotiating
table. As stated in the note, Clausewitz envisioned a careful rewriting of
his treatise in order to explore the two types throughout its pages.
For Colson, this groundbreaking idea pertained less to a sudden
change of mind but was instead a product of a long and careful
reconsideration (384). Clausewitz’s diverse experiences between 1793
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and 1815, which Colson meticulously emphasizes on the biography’s
pages, revealed the complexities of real war and how narrow, misguided,
and counterproductive “the imagination of war as a series of victories
and victory battles” was (385). Again, Clausewitz demonstrated he was
an individual who was well ahead of his time and could, through a
careful thought process, project both timeless and innovative concepts.
Colson’s Clausewitz deserves to find its English-language publisher
and wider audience. It is a carefully researched and well written scholarly
work. Yet thanks to its dynamic and accessible style and lively details,
it reads like a gripping novel. To assist its readers, the French publisher
Perrin also offers clever props such as a short chronicle of Clausewitz’s
life, year by year, and an index of geographical locations with their
nineteenth-century names and statehood, followed by the modern ones.
An American edition would probably require some amendments to
accommodate an audience less knowledgeable of European history.

More On War
By Martin van Creveld
Reviewed by F. G. Hoffman, National Defense University

T
Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017
227 pages
$16.36

he Israeli historian Martin van Creveld established his reputation as
a scholar decades ago. His early works, especially Command in War
and Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, became and remain
mandatory requirements for any professional military library. These
works combined solid history with clear, blunt, and enduring
insights. More recently van Creveld has written on cultures of warfare
and about the changing face of war. These books spoke more to
contemporary context in Israel. But with More On War van Creveld
returns to military theory and provides an occasionally provocative
update to Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz.
In his introduction, the author asserts a number of shortfalls in the
published writings of the two major strategic theorists from whom we
extract the most meaning today:
•• neither “has anything to say about the causes of war or the purposes
for which it is fought (3)
•• both “tend to make war appear more rational and more subject to
control than it is” (4)
•• both “come close to ignoring the implements of war, (i.e. the field
broadly known as military technology)” (5)
These statements will surely surprise students of war familiar with
Clausewitz’s concepts about the pervasive presence of passion, enmity,
fog, and friction at all levels of war. But it is true that Clausewitz chose
not to pay attention to the role of technology in war. Clausewitz lived
in an age where military technology was static and equally available to
protagonists. Scholars, including Hew Strachan in Clausewitz’s On War:
A Biography, argue the longevity of Clausewitz is precisely because he
ignored the transitory changes of technology for the more critical role
of politics, moral forces, and the human dimension.
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Military strategists will find van Creveld’s strategy chapter to be
particularly valuable. In this most original chapter of the book, and the
least tied to the canon, van Creveld contrasts the polar tensions of any
“strategy in action.” These include
•• maintenance of aim versus flexibility;
•• concentration versus dispersion;
•• battle versus maneuver;
•• breakthrough versus envelopment;
•• advance versus retreat; and
•• strength versus weakness.
In this chapter the real major choices available to commanders, like
direct versus indirect, annihilation versus dislocation, or attrition versus
exhaustion are not adequately addressed. Readers should see Antulio J.
Echevarria’s Military Strateg y: A Very Short Introduction for these strategic
options. This is an interesting approach to military strategy, ideal for
use in classroom and Joint Professional Military Education settings;
however, its connection to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz is limited.
More On War contains numerous creative chapters that seek to
extend our understanding of theory in its contemporary context. Given
the classical theoreticians were seemingly land-centric, van Creveld adds
a chapter on war at sea. However, the chapter does not apply the key
elements of policy, fog and friction, culminating points, or centers of
gravity to naval warfare.
Other contributions include chapters that Sun Tzu would have
been intensely interested in. These include a chapter on air, space, cyber
war, as well as one on nuclear war. Air power has been the subject of
intense development for many years, but few of its advocates find use
in Clausewitz. Both Colonel John Boyd’s and John Warden’s writings
were suffused with connections to Clausewitz. On War’s centers of
gravity, friction, fog of war, and decision-making were central to Boyd’s
understanding of war. Warden used the term “center of gravity” several
dozen times in Air Campaign, and explicitly cited Clausewitz nine times.
Neither embraced every element of the classics, but both found value
in starting with them to make their own arguments about generating
military effects. Several writers in the last decade have worked to apply
the traditional theories to new domains like cyber—such as Craig
Greathouse’s useful comments in “Cyber War and Strategic Thought: Do
the Classic Theorists Still Matter?” in Cyberspace and International Relations.
Likewise, Denmark’s Jeppe T. Jacobsen’s work The Cyberwar Mirage and
the Utility of Cyberattacks in War—How to Make Real Use of Clausewitz in
the Age of Cyberspace, has relevance. Van Creveld could have exploited
those insights to underscore the utility of the canonical theories to these
modern dimensions.
Another innovation was the author’s inclusion of a chapter on
law. The security field has taken an interest in lawfare partially due to
apparent Chinese exploitation of legal maneuvers as part of their “Three
Warfares” concept. There is more work needed in this area, and readers
seeking ideas should review the writings of the Heritage Foundation’s
expert on China Dean Cheng.
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In the conclusion, those opening misinterpretations of Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu come full cycle. The author adopts a Hegelian technique
and offers a synthesis more in keeping with the fundamental teachings:
•• “A great many things have not changed, nor do they seem about to
change. The challenge war presents and the demands it makes to those
who wage it do not change either”(196–97).
•• “The fundamental principles of strategy are dictated less by the tools
it uses than by its own nature” (198).
•• “War is a flexible and inventive beast. Like some mythical shape-shifter,
it will adapt itself without giving up its essential nature” (199).
These conclusions are far more consistent with the perspectives, one
from the East and one from the West, that frame our basic understanding
of war. There is a reason that Clausewitz remains relevant today.
Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz can be accused of being both endlessly
frustrating and consistently invaluable. After reading More On War, their
continued utility will be self-evident. No one else has been able to grasp
the essence of war so succinctly—even if seemingly convoluted at times.
Sun Tzu may be even more valuable in an emerging era of great-power
competition with an Asian rival, and the greater odds of surprise and
deception today.
Their value is augmented, not replaced by van Creveld’s chapters on
the various domains and dimensions of war that today’s practitioners
must contend with. The author deserves credit for helping modern
students of war apply classical thinking to contemporary times. Some
readers might be concerned that van Creveld has committed heresy.
However, as Colin Gray once quipped “On War is not ‘Holy Writ.’ ” It is
simply the best distillation of historically based theory we have.
More On War is recommended for those with a bent for thinking and
for specialists in the various domains like airpower or cyber that are still
searching for their own Prussian sage.

Regional Studies
China’s Military Transformation
By You Ji
Reviewed by Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

O
Cambridge: Polity, 2016
284 pages
$22.95

ne of the world’s leading experts on the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has produced an important book. Readers should be clear
at the outset: China’s Military Transformation is not a comprehensive or
up-to-date assessment of the PLA under People’s Republic of China
(PRC) President and Central Military Commission Chair Xi Jinping who
has dominated Chinese politics since 2012. Moreover, this volume does
not provide a thorough overview or analysis of the organizational reforms of China’s national defense establishment announced in late
2013 and underway in earnest since 2015. Those seeking an up-todate assessment of China’s defense reforms must look elsewhere. This
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reviewer highly recommends the fine occasional paper authored by
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age
of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 2017).
So what is China’s Military Transformation about? The study is an
illuminating and authoritative examination of some major facets of the
PLA under the tenures of Xi Jinping’s two immediate predecessors—
Jiang Zemin (1992–2002) and Hu Jintao (2002–12). This book is perhaps
best described as the long delayed sequel to You’s earlier volume, The
Armed Forces of China, published by IB Tauris in 1999. The book under
review makes good use of in-country interviews and primary Chinese
language sources to solidly address “a select spectrum of PLA reform”
(22). You pens illuminating chapters on civil-military relations, the
PLA’s role in national security policymaking, and developments in
aerospace, maritime, and the paramilitary People’s Armed Police. There
is also a particularly fascinating chapter on the evolution of military
strategy since 1949. What is missing, however, is comparable coverage
of the PLA’s strategic rocket force or ground forces.
Despite these omissions, a particular strength of the study is the
rare combination of authoritative analyses of both the hard and soft
power dimensions of the PLA. Most examinations of China’s military
modernization focus almost exclusively on hardware—numbers and
capabilities of new and anticipated weapon systems and platforms—
while overlooking key softer elements such as strategy and civil-military
relations. On the question of military allegiance to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), You makes the important but overlooked
observation that “the PLA has little incentive or need to disobey the
Party” because the military is a highly privileged organization that tends
to be well resourced by the CCP (29).
A recurrent theme permeating this volume is that over the years the
United States—both in its policies, military activities, and own defense
transformations—has been an underappreciated impetus for change in
China’s military. The PLA has undertaken three waves of modernization
since 1949. The first wave, which occurred in the 1950s, was in response
to the Korean conflict when PRC leaders realized the serious limitations
of the World War I-era Chinese forces when confronting the World
War II-era US military on the battlefield. The second wave of PLA
modernization occurred in the 1980s when China emerged from its
Maoist-era trance to an embarrassing performance in a short border war
against Vietnam in 1979. This prompted the PLA undergo extensive
reforms and downsizing with the US military as its prime exemplar.
The third wave of PLA reforms began in the 1990s prompted by
the recognition that, despite considerable military reform over the previous decade, China’s armed forces remained far from the equal of the
armed forces of any other great power. What was particularly shocking
for top Chinese political and military leaders were the impressive
high-tech displays of the US military prowess in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, and the 1998–99 air campaign
against Kosovo, which included the accidental US bombing of the PRC
embassy in Belgrade (125–35). (Many in China believe that this was
an intentional act.)
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Where the PLA’s aircraft carrier program is concerned, You focuses
on the array of aspirational maritime operational requirements carriers
are intended to meet, while omitting the fact that this program has also
been driven by a deep desire to compete with and counter the impressive
aircraft carriers of the US Navy (201–14). American carriers have signaled
on multiple occasions US power projection capabilities and persistent
presence in the western Pacific, including during the Taiwan Strait
crisis noted above. The combined impact of these displays provided the
impetus for the PLA to launch the shift from mechanized forces toward
an Information Age defense establishment. Not surprisingly, the model
for this effort was the US military.
You writes with considerable insight as well as from personal
experience—he literally grew up in the PLA because his father was a
general and he was raised in a military compound. This book is required
reading for PLA watchers and anyone seeking to understand the process
of China’s incomplete military transformation.

Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and
Uncertain Course
By Andrew S. Erickson
Reviewed by Carl O. Schuster, Visiting Professor, Hawaii Pacific University

C
Annapolis, MD: China
Maritime Institute and The
Naval Institute Press, 2016
332 pages
$28.83

hina’s expanding fleet and operations have raised questions about
its future capabilities and intentions. However, few examine China’s
other maritime components, its merchant marine, coast guard, maritime
militia, and the shipbuilding industry that supports them all. That industry
experienced an unprecedented 13-fold increase in capacity from 2002 to
2013—one encompassing more than just shipyards. Naval shipbuilding
integrates heavy industry, electronics and information technology, and
and large-scale propulsion systems to construct weapons platforms
that balance human habitation, fuel, ordnance, aviation support, and
seakeeping requirements to meet a nation’s operational and strategic
needs. As such, it provides insight into the future plans and intentions
of the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN). In writing Chinese
Naval Shipbuilding, Dr. Andrew Erickson and his team have made a vital
contribution to understanding China’s ability to build and maintain its
maritime forces, especially the PLAN.
China’s shipbuilding industry is the world’s largest, constructing
more ships, and a greater variety of them, than any other. It has given
Beijing the world’s third largest merchant marine and the largest fishing
fleets. China also has the world’s largest coast guard and is on track to
possess the world’s second largest navy by 2020. But numbers alone do
not tell the story. Via a combination of imitative innovation, extensive
study of foreign developments, and heavy investment in technology,
China has leapfrogged several stages of combat systems, sensor, and
weapons developments.
An industry and scientific community once devastated by war and the
Cultural Revolution has evolved from producing copies of obsolescent
post-World War II designs 40 years ago to one manufacturing and
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installing the latest sensors, weapons, communications, and information
technology into hulls that incorporate the most recent advances in stealth
features and shipbuilding techniques. By 2025, PLAN will qualitatively
match, or be closely equivalent to the United States Navy. Rapid though
that improvement has been, it is the result of an evolutionary design
process driven by a combination of changing strategy and mission
requirements as defined by the PLAN’s Naval Research Institute;
and the Naval Armaments Research Institute’s (PLAN’s research and
development community’s) judgements.
During the last 30 years, China has modernized its doctrine as
well as its military equipment to meet the nation’s evolving national
security requirements. The brief Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) exposed
the limitations of Mao’s “People’s War Doctrine,” forcing a reevaluation
of China’s approach to war. The resulting active defense doctrine of the
mid-1980s extended the PLAN’s mission to one of active defense of
the near seas. The “near seas” consisted of the seas near China’s coast
out to the “First Island Chain”—Spratly Islands, Indonesia, Philippines,
Taiwan, and the Japanese Islands. The distance and level of PLAN’s
naval operations has been expanding slowly and steadily since. From
a defensive mission, the PLAN now must safeguard China’s overseas
interests, protect its sea lines of communications, and contribute to
international security. That last mission is exemplified by the PLAN
joining the UN-mandated Indian Ocean anti-piracy operations in
2008. Then civil strife and conflicts forced the evacuation of thousands
of Chinese citizens from African and Middle Eastern countries. In
addition to providing valuable logistical and operational experience, the
deployments strengthened China’s diplomatic and strategic engagement
with Africa, the Middle East, and ultimately Europe. The PLAN is now
a permanent fixture and exercise partner in those waters.
China’s technological base initially struggled to keep pace with fleet
requirements but caught up within the last decade via foreign acquisition
and derivative development. Post-2009 PLAN warships are no longer
equipped with 1950s-era radars and weapons systems. They carry new
longer-ranged surface-to-air missiles derived from Russian designs but
largely retain the PLAN’s initial focus on anti-surface ship warfare, with
newer and more deadly anti-ship cruise missiles. Ships commissioned
since 2012 have Vertical Launch Systems for their missiles, accelerating
their combat engagement cycles and increasing their ordnance load.
To improve power projection, China acquired a derelict ex-Soviet
aircraft carrier in 1998. Commissioned in September 2012, the ski-ramp
equipped Liaoning has served as a fleet training and doctrinal development
tool, enabling the integration of naval aviation into fleet operations.
Future carriers will incorporate a conventional takeoff and landing
system, giving the carrier greater striking power, range and flexibility.
The PLAN started installing land attack cruise missiles on surface ships
and submarines in 2013. But, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities
remained underdeveloped. More ships were capable of embarking ASW
helicopters but the ships were limited to hull-mounted sonars until
variable depth sonars and towed arrays became available in 2014.
The submarine force has seen similar evolutionary upgrades since
the late 1980s. Hull designs became more streamlined and propulsion
systems more powerful and reliable. In the 1990s, Chia acquired Russian
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Kilo-class submarines with anechoic coatings that reduced vulnerability to
active sonar detection and battery technology that increased underwater
speed and endurance. China also purchased air-independent-propulsion
technology a decade ago. It then incorporated all those technologies in its
Yuan-class conventional submarines. However, for prestigious reasons,
the Communist Party rejected using foreign technology in its nuclearpowered submarine program with costly results. China’s early nuclear
powered submarines, the Xia ballistic missile and Han-class attack
submarines were underpowered, noisy, and difficult to operate. Their
problems forced a 20-year hiatus in nuclear submarine construction.
The nuclear-powered Jin-class SSBNs and Sang-class SSNs built since
2011 have better sensors and more reliable power plants, but they retain
their predecessor’s noisy acoustic signatures.
Dr. Erickson’s team has written the most comprehensive study
of China’s shipbuilding industry extant. The book’s maps and tables
clarify and strengthen the narrative. Chinese Naval Shipbuilding presents a
detailed, in-depth assessment of the PLAN’s future. Relying extensively
on Chinese-language sources, the authors base their analysis on intimate
knowledge of the economic, political, and strategic factors underpinning
China’s maritime activities from the PRC’s beginnings. They discuss
economic factors most other books ignore. They note China’s slowing
economy will constrict future defense funding growth and Beijing
eventually must shift resources from construction to maintenance as
expanded naval operations increase the wear on fleet units. Funding
global operations will also come at the expense of construction monies.
Well organized, insightful, and succinctly written, this is a must-read for
serious students of China’s maritime and economic developments.

Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire
By Agnia Grigas
Reviewed by Richard J. Krickus, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the
University of Mary Washington and former Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting
Strategy at the US Marine Corps University.

New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2016
352 pages
$39.98

I

n August 1993, as a convoy of Russian trucks rumbled through the
cobblestoned streets of old-town Vilnius, the last one carried an
ominous message: “We will be back!” The locals who applauded the exit
of their “elder brothers” took comfort in the thought that never again
would Russian tanks traverse the byways of Lithuania. Confidence along
these lines later surged when the Baltic democracies entered the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and rejoiced in the safe harbor of Article 5.
But President Trump caused alarm in Eastern Europe when, on a
spring trip abroad, he failed to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to
collective defense. What’s more, when German respondents were asked
whether or not their country should safeguard the security of the Baltic
democracies in face of Russian armed aggression, most answered “No!”
Not surprisingly, citizens of other former Soviet Russian republics are
especially unnerved by the thought that, after the 2008 war in Georgia
and the Crimean putsch several years later, they will be the next victims
of “little green men.”
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To put these concerns in perspective, Agnia Grigas has written an
important book, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, which explains
why these concerns prevail throughout much of the old Soviet space. Well
written and powerfully argued, this book rests on extensive research and
interviews of people residing in the “near abroad.” Grigas’s narrative
justifies speculation among Russian experts that Vladimir Putin is bent
on the “re-imperializaton of Russia.” Toward this end, he hopes to exploit
the 25 million ethnic Russians and over 100 million Russian speakers,
“the compatriots,” who once resided in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, were considered a financial liability by Moscow upon the
Soviet Empire’s demise, and became an asset as the Russian economy
grew with a spike in oil prices. They served as a vital component in Putin’s
campaign to restore the Russian empire and, in turn, disembowel both
the European Union and NATO. This aspect of Putin’s foreign policy
has not received the attention it deserves by American security analysts,
and Grigas’s book ably fills this gap. Simultaneously, her unmasking of
this bold strategic campaign will be useful to those who are considering
the pros and cons of a reset in relations with Russia, which is one of the
major elements of President Trump’s foreign policy.
The people who are the central focus of her book represent a
significant segment of residents in Central Asia, the Baltics, Ukraine,
Georgia, and other former political entities that were once subjects of
various Russian empires—Czarist, Soviet, and today. Putin’s campaign
involves seven stages:
1. Soft power. The Russian language, the Russian Orthodox Church,
and extensive media outlets and business enterprises under Moscow’s
control that penetrate all the societies in question
2. Humanitarian polices. Real and alleged human rights violations to
promote turmoil within targeted societies
3. Compatriot policies. Honoring former Soviet policies such as pensions
for the elderly and educational opportunities for the young
4. Passportization. Compatriots without citizenship status who have
passports and retain the opportunity to return “home”
5. Information warfare. “Aggressive use of propaganda to destabilize,
demoralize, or manipulate the target audience and achieve an
advantage over an opponent including by seeking to deny, degrade,
corrupt or destroy the opponent’s sources of information” (44)
6. Protection. Scrutinizing the soft power represented above to display
hard power
7. Annexation. Formal or de facto annexations of the territories where
compatriots reside
Beyond Crimea is a valuable source for defense and foreign policy
analysts and practitioners who are taking stock of the pros and cons of
resetting relations with Russia, which according to conventional wisdom
may be sabotaged by America’s preoccupation with our 2016 presidential
election. But that distraction will have little bearing on Putin’s drive
to impose Russia’s influence upon the former entities of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. To a significant degree, because of Putin’s
skillful exploitation of the compatriot issue, he has successfully disrupted
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the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Among other things, he has forestalled—
perhaps permanently—Georgian and Ukrainian efforts to join the EU
and NATO while fostering serious discord between the Europeans
and Americans. American strategists who are working to counter this
campaign of disruption should read this book and consider some of the
author’s countermoves while acknowledging some disturbing facts.
First, the West must appreciate that Putin’s campaign is real and not
a flight of Cold War fancy. We must not adopt the realist perspective that
all of these countries “belong” to Russia, and it is foolhardy to think
otherwise. Furthermore, Grigas observes it is a profound intellectual
mistake to accept the Kremlin’s view of the status and nature of the
compatriots. In her interviews, she found people so identified may favor
Russian TV and share feelings of solidarity with other former Soviet
citizens but prefer living in their new homelands and not Putin’s Russia.
That said, the West must recognize that scenario is being outplayed
in Europe’s hybrid warfare with Russia. Putin’s drive to restore Russia’s
imperial outreach is showing results as many eastern-bloc countries in
the EU and NATO have sought closer ties with Moscow. Furthermore,
the Americans and the Europeans have assumed that when the ball is
in the soft-power court, they are favored to win, but the fact may be
just the opposite as recent events indicate. In response, the West should
develop aid programs, including education and training, for many of
the countries that are Putin’s target. The EU and NATO must “create
information alternatives to Russian propaganda” and prepare “for
Russia’s hybrid warfare” (255–56). This means “countering transnational
paramilitary groups, as well as engaging separatist territories and frozenconflict zones” (256). At the same time, Grigas has words of criticism
for the countries at risk. They are not paying sufficient attention to
legitimate grievances of their compatriots regarding arms, drugs, human
trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and collapsed economies.
Prominent scholars, such as Steven Blank, and diplomats, such
as Michael McFaul, have justifiably applauded Grigas’s book, but one
cannot ignore one of its shortcomings—that is, not spending more time
on the role organized crime plays in the Kremlin’s reimperialization
campaign. Russian criminal organizations, often with the complicity of
indigenous mafias, play a critical role in corrupting the economic and
political systems of all former Soviet entities. They continue to exploit
the transition period from communism to a free market where even
otherwise patriotic cultural, economic, and political elites are vulnerable
to kompromat because of dodgy practices on their part or maturing
legal systems. In short, Russian bankers and business tycoons are so
entangled with organized crime figures it is impractical to deal with
them as separate entities. The same holds true of the oligarchs and their
involvement with Russian security institutions. Clearly, more work must
be done on this score, but that is the subject of another book.
Finally, in light of the disarray that afflicts the Euro-Atlantic Alliance
today, there is no reason to be optimistic that the Western response
to Putin’s reimperialization campaign will be up and running any time
soon. Planners at the Departments of State and Defense must rectify
that situation as soon as possible
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NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia,
and Beyond
Edited by Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta
Reviewed by Elie Perot, PhD candidate, Institute for European Studies (IES),
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

T

he troubles in Ukraine have compelled NATO to shift its attention
back to the Old Continent. After years during which collective
defense was not at the front stage of the Alliance’s preoccupations, the
renewed focus on this mission is a small revolution. In brief, NATO is
back in Europe and back to its original raison d’être.
But, to what extent is this true, and to what extent should it be
the case? To put it differently, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, how
has NATO struck a balance between diverging geographical priorities
and between its three self-assigned missions (i.e., collective defense,
crisis management and collective security)? And what should the future
equilibrium look like? These are the questions to which NATO’s Return to
Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond intends to provide an answer.
As indicated by the editors, the book’s chapters can be grouped
under three broad sections. The first one focuses on the major strategic
issues facing NATO today. The opening chapter by John R. Deni argues
NATO’s current force posture is ill-prepared to deter conventional
aggression by Russia as a consequence of the continuous decrease of
allies’ armed forces—despite the adaptation and reassurance measures
recently adopted. As underlined by Schuyler Foerster in the subsequent
chapter, however, the continuing relevance of extended deterrence for
NATO should not let us forget that such a strategy inevitably raises
perennial credibility concerns and dilemmas. Foerster warns against
extending the deterrence guarantee towards NATO’s partners such as
Ukraine and Georgia, as this would result in a “dilution” of the guarantee.
In turn, Andrew T. Wolff weighs the prospects for further enlargement
of NATO to encompass Ukraine. Contemplating the respective tradeoffs entailed by Ukraine’s membership, or by the present status quo,
the author argues then in favor of a third option, which would be to
renounce enlargement of NATO—an appeasement signal sent to
Moscow—while establishing another type of relationship with Kiev to
encourage democratic reforms.
In the fourth chapter, Magnus Petersson examines to what extent
the global and the regional ambitions of NATO are pushing the Alliance
into incompatible directions. Expeditionary strategy and territorial
defense are two approaches that complement one another, as both
presuppose a certain degree of interoperability and offensive capabilities.
In a similar vein, Sten Rynning shows several lessons learned by NATO
in Afghanistan can be put to good use in future contingencies: the need
to share the same politico-strategic vision among Allies, the necessity
to adopt a comprehensive approach, and the requirement of close
coordination with operational partners.
The second section of the book deals with NATO’s partnership
policy and security cooperation with Russia. Ivan Dinev Ivanov assesses
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the relationship between the various patterns of institutionalization
of NATO’s partnership agenda and the compliance of the Alliance’s
partners with its security policies. Of particular interest is the description
of NATO’s central partnership dilemma between extending the “liberal
security order” in Europe, for example, to Ukraine or Georgia and
keeping a stable relationship with Moscow. Continuing this discussion,
Rebecca Moore shows that, although the Ukraine crisis has made clear
that NATO’s Article 5 does not extend to its partners, the Alliance
should not be intimidated into renouncing the liberal order through its
partnership policy. The last chapter of this section, by Damon Coletta,
delves into the opportunities for NATO-Russia technical cooperation,
in particular on missile defense. Hindered in many ways since the
Ukraine crisis, technical cooperation is nonetheless partially ongoing
and it should be expanded in order to generate positive spill-over effects
for the relationship between NATO and Russia.
The final group of contributions is more eclectic. Huiyun Feng
focuses on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russia-China-US
triangle. If the Russian intervention in Ukraine has contradicted the
principles of noninterference and of the respect of state sovereignty
defended by China, the crisis has also brought Russia and China—
driven by a common rivalry with the United States—to forge closer ties
in the economic, military, and political realms. Finally, the conclusion
of the book, by Stanley R. Sloan, puts the significance of the Ukrainian
crisis for NATO into a broader historical perspective by analyzing the
evolution of the Alliance’s identity through time. The volume closes on
the idea of building a stronger “transatlantic community” through a
deeper cooperation between NATO and the European Union.
In terms of analysis, NATO’S Return to Europe delivers a very robust
and updated overview of the Alliance’s current strategic situation. One
may notice some overlap between contributions, although this may be
unavoidable in an edited volume. Individually, the chapters do not provide
a direct answer to the overall theme of the book, but by reading the
chapters successively, the reader may sketch an overarching conclusion.
In terms of policy prescription, some recommendations advanced
by different contributors may not accord with one another, notably
because of a divergence in their assessments of Moscow’s benign or
hostile intentions. From different diagnostics follow distinct remedies.
Gauging which of these policy options are sound is ultimately a matter
of political judgement, but the necessity of “a Schuman Plan of some
sort” between NATO and Russia may raise more skepticism than more
conventional proposals contained in the book (212).
Some readers may regret no specific chapter has been devoted to
the very issue on which the book ends, namely the relationship between
NATO and the European Union. One could argue that some of today’s
hottest policy proposals, the creation of a “military Schengen,” for
example, precisely revolve around this complex relationship.
In any case, these are minor reservations. The book should be of great
value and interest for practitioners and students of transatlantic relations.
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Technology & War
Nanoweapons: A Growing Threat to Humanity
By Louis A. Del Monte
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army

T

he author of Nanoweapons, Louis A. Del Monte, has a corporate
background in microelectronics, sensors, and integrated circuits at
the micro- and nano-technology levels. He has also written earlier books
on artificial intelligence and time travel (theoretical) to which this book
on the subject of nanoweaponry is, in many ways, a natural progression.
The subject focuses on nano (one billionth of a meter), as opposed
to micro (one millionth of a meter), technology manipulation and
the increasingly evident weaponization potentials this offers to states,
corporations, terrorist organizations, and potentially even brilliant—yet
amoral and unstable—individuals.
The 246-page work is divided into acknowledgements, an introduction, three thematic parts (The First Generation of Nanoweapons,
The Game Changers, and The Tipping Point) spanning 12 chapters, an
epilogue, three appendices, notes, glossary, and an index.
Nanotechnologies—unbeknownst to most of us—are becoming
ubiquitous in the consumer, industrial, and medical industries with a
product value exceeding $1 trillion dollars (43). Further, they have a
projected value of $6 trillion by 2025, which would place their product
valuation at about 7 percent of the entire global economy (34). In
addition, active American (leader), Chinese (a near follower), and Russian
(a distant third) nanoweaponry programs exist at the classified level
(67). While the majority of information pertaining to these programs
is shrouded in secrecy, Del Monte has been able to synthesize enough
disparate open source intelligence together to create basic outlines of US
military service initiatives as well as those belonging to a number of other
nations—both potentially belligerent as well as allied (45–75, 191–203).
The initial generations of nanoweapons as discussed in the work
clearly function as enhancers of present conventional—even nuclear—
weaponry as well as sensors, body (or tank) armor, and a host of other
forms of matériel. For example, nanoparticles added to explosives or
even nukes are able to enhance their efficiency and destructive yield
and, in some instances, even allow for their miniaturization (11,
47–48). It is not this component of the work, however, which is its real
importance. Rather, it is the potential longer-term technological trends
some decades away where the strategic implications of this advanced
weaponry form become significant. These are derived from the projected
emergence of advanced computers with artificial intelligence, such as
singularity computers, that will, at some point, exceed the combined
intellect of humanity coupled with the development of self-replicating
smart nanobots (139–42).
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My impression from the book, in which I agree with the author’s
primary concerns, is that nanoweaponry is rapidly becoming the third
rider beside nuclear and biological weapons in a potential technological
apocalypse. This form of weaponry offers a new set of horrors that can
be inflicted upon humanity. The subject matter appears very science
fiction-like and is reminiscent of Frank Herbert’s 1982 novel The White
Plague in which a molecular biologist creates a designer bioweapon that
becomes a scientific reality, which exceeds even the early projections
of that genre.
That said, a basic criticism of Nanoweapons is that essentially no
literature review was conducted related to the small number of earlier
works on the technology predating this effort. While K. Eric Drexler’s
celebrated 1986 text Engines of Creation is highlighted—as are other
important nanotechnology related events and over 150 notes (typically
Internet citations) related to data points, technologies, and governmental
programs—specific topical works are ignored. For instance, no mention
is made of Daniel and Mark A. Ratners’ Nanotechnolog y and Homeland
Security, Jurgen Altmann’s Military Nanotechnolog y, or Margaret Kosal’s
Nanotechnolog y for Chemical and Biological Defense. Another criticism is that
Del Monte—by his own admission—is a technologist and not well versed
in policy, or for that matter, international affairs (187). So when he makes
military and arms control suggestions or envisions the international
system of 2050, he is not always authoritative in his arguments.
Even with these inherent criticisms, given the glaring dearth of
unclassified works on nanoweaponry, the book fills an important and
critical gap in an emerging and little-understood area of twenty-first
century military science. The area is one that the author, accurately
proposes will result in the rise of powerful nanoweaponry-armed
states (and, potentially, even corporations), and where a misstep with
this cutting edge technology could someday potentially result in an
extinction-level event equivalent to that of a strategic nuclear exchange
taking place between the Russia and the United States.

The Future of War: A History
By Lawrence Freedman
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

L
New York: Public
Affairs, 2017
400 pages
$30.00

awrence Freedman, the author of The Future of War: A History, is an
Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and
has had a long and illustrious career, which he points out is by no means
over. His is a familiar name to the Parameters readership—due both to
his decades long series of highly acclaimed books written on war and
strategy and his contributions to this journal; see, for instance, Beyond
Surprise Attack (Summer 2017) which draws upon The Future of War—the
focus of this review.
The work has been written as a historiography of future-war thinking
and projections—not as a projection of future (around mid-twenty-first
century) warfare itself. It predominately draws upon the perspectives
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of the United Kingdom and the United States, due to their sequential
positions as dominant global powers, and encompasses thought, theory,
and military affairs related to the late mid-nineteenth century into the
contemporary and emerging eras (xix). The book is divided into three
parts: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 through the end of the
Cold War (1989), 1990s through contemporary issues, and developing
and future concerns. These three historical sequences are dominated
by multi- and then bi-polarity (such as great powers and superpowers);
unipolarity (the United States as the last remaining superpower), statefragility, and the rise of violent nonstate actors; and resurgent multi- or
bi-polarity along with the concurrent emergence of high-tech weaponry.
The book is well referenced, has an extensive bibliograpy, and an index
for keyword and name searches.
The approach utilized in The Future of War: A History is one that:
locates the writing on future war in the concerns of the time. The aim is not
just to assess how prescient different writers were, or whether they could
have done better given what was known about new weaponry or the experience of recent wars, but to explore the prevailing understandings about the
causes of war and their likely conduct and course. How people imagined the
wars of the future affected the conduct and course of those wars when they
finally arrived. Unanticipated wars, in forms that had not been imagined,
left participants and commentators struggling to understand where they had
come from and how they might best be fought (xix).

Much of the work’s value for the practitioner exists in its final
couple of chapters. Chapter 24 “Coming Wars,” for instance, initially
highlights Major General Robert Scales’s five schools of future wars
thinking (264–65). Chapter 25, “The Future of the Future of War,” on
the other hand, revisits important themes discussed in the book related
to the forecasting of knockout blows (such as quick victory scenarios)
(277–79), the significance of the development of nuclear weapons on
future war thinking (280–81), whether the America’s present position as
the predominant military power may continue (282), ring of institutional
boundaries related to the state, and even war and peace itself, as a result
of gray-zone conflicts (284–85).
Criticisms of the work are difficult to find, but a slight issue potentially
exists in the author’s ongoing use of thematic chapter foci—essentially,
the minivignettes, such as those, focusing on barbarism, cyberwar,
robots and drones, and megacities in some of the later chapters—which
provide a quick and dirty overview of a theme along with some dominant
concepts pertaining to it sourced to well-known scholars—for example
Mary Kaldor’s New Wars (143–44) or Dunlap’s “lawfare” (201–2). This
fast paced “short video clip” approach may lead the lay or undergraduate
reader to readily accept the lessons learned without needing or wanting
to understand the full extent of the argument Freedman presents.
In summation, Freedman’s The Future of War would be highly useful
for graduate and War College level military strategy courses and those
focused on better understanding the rationale behind and biases inherent
in producing visions of future warfare. While some general readership
interest may exist for the work, its arguments—and a reader’s ability to
contextualize them along the continuum of late mid-nineteenth century
military developments—are too daunting for undergraduate level study.
Still, the work is extremely well written and an erudite product produced
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by a renowned military theorist. It should, without reservation, be
considered a welcome addition to both the personal library of the more
seasoned scholar as well as that of the senior level officer.

War in 140 Characters: How Social Media is Reshaping
Conflict in the Twenty-First Century
By David Patrikarakos
Reviewed by James Farwell, Associate Fellow in the Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College

New York: Basic
Books, 2017
320 pages
$17.67

T

his lively account describes how Twitter and Facebook are changing
the dimension of warfare. He argues social media has helped to
dismantle traditional information and media hierarchies. That point has
been well made elsewhere. Patrikarakos’s contribution is to bring alive
the realities of this change through the experiences of individuals dealing
with the Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine to weaponize social media.
The stories of Palestinian Farah Baker and two Israelis, Lieutenant
Colonel Peter Lerner and David Rubenstein, show how social media can
create global impact.
Sixteen years old, Farah bore witness to Israel’s 2014 incursions into
Gaza. Her credibility lay in her status as an eyewitness. Photographs
and vivid language brought home the emotion and horror of a little
girl trying to survive battlefield violence. She used Twitter to highlight
the most extreme effects of war, garner sympathy, and build public
support for Gaza by showing the extent of the carnage that the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) was wreaking. “BOMBING CHILDREN IS
NOT OKAY,” she tweeted. “That when u know that HUMANITY
DIED. #Gaza.”
Her tweets show how users reacting in real time can powerfully
bypass media filters and articulate ground realities. Using media to tell a
story that detailed what she was living through, Farah defined a powerful
message: war caused children to suffer. She showed that controlling the
narrative mattered as much or more than kinetic warfare.
Imaginative and brilliant Israelis such as Lerner and Rubenstein
proved resourceful. Israelis had to show they were not targeting civilians.
They responded rapidly, using YouTube to generate powerful visuals
to get out their narratives. Sending out clear and compelling content
caused legacy media—broadcast networks—to pick it up. Israel thus
refocused the perspective through which actions should be judged. Their
technique started sentences with verbs and created titles and subtitles for
the illustrations of the battlefield violence, which bolstered credibility.
In Ukraine, Anna Sandalova proved the power of Facebook in
assembling a volunteer network that supplied Ukrainian soldiers fighting
Russian-backed separatists. The author’s account of the effort provides
a primer on how to use weaponized Facebook for troop support.
Notable is the account of how Elliot Higgins proved that crowdsourcing
intelligence can beat government bureaucracy. He and a volunteer team
proved that Russian-armed separatists shot down Flight MH17.
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Interesting but less impressive is Patrikarakos’s account of Russian
trolling. That topic has been better covered elsewhere. The section lacks
depth in articulating Russia’s doctrine of hybrid warfare, Attributed
to Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, it calls for a
“hybrid” capability for which the Internet is one tool in the arsenal.
Patrikarokos’s story of Russian troller Vitaly Bespalov is interesting. But
his account fails to explain, as others have, the trolling operation, and
the analysis of Putin’s strategy could use greater dimension.
Patrikarakos’s account of how the Islamic State used social media
to recruit individuals like Sophie Kasiki is well told but adds nothing to
what has been previously written. The final section discusses the State
Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,
supplanted today by the Global Engagement Center, in countering such
narratives. Neither entity has proven successful.
Bottom line. This book is definitely worth a read. The author is a fine
journalist. While imperfect, the book’s strengths add strong insight and
keen understanding into a new, potentially decisive element in conducting
engagement and waging conflict in today’s threat environment.

Irregular Warfare
Eisenhower’s Guerrillas: The Jedburghs, the Maquis, & the
Liberation of France
By Benjamin F. Jones
Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

I

n Eisenhower’s Guerrillas, Benjamin F. Jones examines the operations of
Jedburgh teams in support of the Allied campaign for France in 1944.
Formed into three-person teams, comprised of American, British, and
French service members, the Jedburghs began parachuting into France
just prior to D-Day in order to organize, equip, and train the various
French resistance groups, the Maquis, in guerrilla warfare. Altogether,
93 Jedburgh teams deployed to France, organized tens of thousands of
guerrillas, and coordinated the delivery of hundreds of thousands of
weapons and munitions.
Jones’s research unveils new details regarding the Allied use of the
Maquis during the liberation of France. By delving into American, British,
and French war archives, as well as interviewing Jedburgh and Maquis
veterans, Jones provides fresh perspectives regarding Eisenhower’s
intent with, and ulterior motives for, the Jedburgh mission. Jones
expands on the history of the Jedburghs by tying together the planning
and implementation of their mission, the involvement of other Allied
special forces—often at cross purposes—with the Maquis, and the
reasons for successes and failures among the various Jedburgh teams.
Operating through the Maquis, the Jedburgh mission was to support
the Normandy invasion by sabotaging rail and road bridges, ambushing
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German occupation troops in Brittany, and actively interdicting
German units moving to the Normandy beachhead. Counterintuitively,
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) and the
Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) stressed that the Maquis were not
to instigate a wholesale insurrection for fear of indiscriminate German
reprisals against the population. Restricting Maquis activities until
after the Normandy invasion, SHAEF and SFHQ sought to preclude
German and Vichy French counterespionage operations to neutralize
the Maquis prematurely.
As more Jedburgh teams parachuted into the French interior during
June and July, 1944, the Allied invasion of southern France (early
August) prompted a change in mission—preventing German forces in
southwestern France from withdrawing to the east. The results were
mixed: German armored and mechanized divisions managed to avoid
capture; however, the Maquis forced the surrender of one German
infantry division. Ultimately, the failure to ensnare substantial numbers
of German troops permitted a defensive line to be established in eastern
France. One important lesson from the latter stages of fighting in France
is that the Jedburghs and the Maquis were more effective when rear areas
existed, but less so once German divisions began streaming eastwards.
The Jedburghs faced numerous challenges. This political tension
inhibited cooperation, and these groups refused to cooperate with one
another due to these differences. Paradoxically, the communist resistance
groups were better organized, motivated, and fought more effectively, a
fact the Jedburghs quickly recognized and supported.
The Jedburghs’s inability to arm hundreds of thousands of Maquis
who enthusiastically materialized after the Normandy invasion
stemmed from various causes. Significantly, SHAEF and SFHQ vastly
underestimated the number of French who wanted to end the German
occupation and replace the Vichy government. Successful supply drops
required good weather, appropriate moon phases, and secure drop
zones, which rarely aligned. Communications between the Jedburgh
teams and SFHQ to coordinate the airdrops was also problematic when
communications sergeants were injured or the radios were destroyed.
Finally, Eisenhower wanted to limit the number of armed Maquis (less
than 120,000) to prevent their activities from spiraling out of control.
For Eisenhower, the Jedburghs served a higher purpose than
disrupting German operations, a revelation that Jones explains in detail.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s
persistent refusal to recognize General Charles de Gaulle’s provisional
government, French Committee of National Liberation, until the fall
of 1944, posed significant challenges for the successful prosecution of
the war. To optimize combat power on the front, Eisenhower sought to
have de Gaulle’s provisional government assume governance functions
at the local and national level so as to minimize the need to secure the
rear areas with combat troops.
Accordingly, Eisenhower appointed French General Pierre Koenig
as a SHAEF field commander, making him responsible for the French
Forces of the Interior and the various French military delegates, as well
as control of the Maquis through the Jedburgh teams. As the Allies
liberated France, Koenig incorporated scores of Maquis groups into the
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Free French Army. In this manner, de Gaulle enjoyed the political support
of the French people and was able to assume control of government.
Jones’s account of the Jedburghs is often repetitious and confusing,
which is understandable given the complexity of French and Allied
attitudes and agendas regarding the political landscape, the plethora
of personalities involved, and the magnitude of the Jedburgh mission.
Fortunately, Jones provides two appendices on the French resistance
leaders and the Jedburgh teams, outlining names, assigned regions, and
deployment dates. The maps depicting Jedburgh locations and activities
are also essential for reader understanding.
For strategic leaders, Eisenhower’s Guerrillas provides useful insights
in the use of resistance groups in occupied territories in conjunction with
the execution of conventional military campaigns. Jones emphasizes
that Jedburgh-like teams are quite effective in occupied enemy
territories but fail dismally in enemy countries with domestic resistance
groups. He concludes such resistance groups lack the requisite passion,
organization, and wherewithal to overthrow the government of a police
state. Strategic leaders will find Jones’ history of the Jedburgh teams and
his keen insights invaluable.

Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark MagicoReligious Activities
Edited by Robert J. Bunker
Reviewed by Nathan Jones, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies,
Sam Houston State University

B

lood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark Magico-Religious
Activities is an edited volume that addresses some of the more
extreme violence found on the twenty-first century criminal and
insurgent battlefields. Editor and author of a particularly strong chapter,
Robert Bunker has assembled a strong cast of authors including Dawn
Perlmutter and Paul Rexton Kan to explore this understudied topic.
The general thrust of their argument is that the role of blood sacrifice
and dark magic symbols, is understudied, under-recognized and underappreciated in the modern study of violent nonstate actors (VNSA).
In addition to the preface and introductory chapter, the book
consists of five topical essays, one review essay, four book reviews, and
a postscript. Various chapters introduce case studies on the use of dark
magico-religious activities—that are so defined because “they involve
morally reprehensible acts directed at other human beings”—including
case studies of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Lord’s
Resistance Army, and Mexican drug trafficking organizations such as
Los Zetas, the Beltran Leyva Organization, and La Familia Michoacána.
Dawn Perlmutter’s preface is masterful and its introduction of
etic and emic cultural anthropological concepts are useful for those
outside the anthropology discipline. Her argument is that a refusal to
acknowledge some of these VNSAs engage in dark magic violence has
led scholars to ignore an important motivation and factor in these violent
acts. Rational choice theorists are at a loss in these types of cases, and the
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dominance of these methodologies has stifled our understanding of and
willingness to even acknowledge VNSA’s use of dark magic.
Bunker’s introduction defines and operationalizes dark as “criminal
in nature and involves morally reprehensible acts directed at other
human beings.” He acknowledges that dark magico-religious criminals
are a small subset of all VNSAs in a useful chart, which provides a
framework for the analysis. As a researcher of Mexican drug trafficking
organizations, I enjoyed Bunker’s chapter on dark magico-religious
violence in Mexico and his discussions of the Saint Death, Santa Muerte,
which graces the cover art of the volume. Bunker argues that while
organized crime or rational choice explanations are not incorrect, “a
much deeper social process can also be said to be taking place.” He goes
on to argue traditional social norms are being supplanted by norms of
criminality, drug use, and violence.
This volume has already received significant attention on Borderland
Beat, a popular webpage covering border security issues, and was reviewed
by Patrick Corcoran for Insight Crime, another popular and respected
website covering organized crime in the Americas. While I agree with
Corcoran’s critique that viewing VNSAs through the economic and
political motivation lens is still best, though he does recognize additional
study is needed, the authors of this volume illustrate the importance of
acknowledging and understanding the dark magico-religious aspects of
their behavior.
Further, authors such as Rexton Kan acknowledge how the rational
choice and economic understandings of VNSAs are not mutually
exclusive with dark magico-religious practices. In his chapter on drug
use by organized criminals, guerrillas, and terrorists, Kan describes how
VNSAs incorporate drug use to enable gruesome killings that build a
reputation. Rexton Kan acknowledges the instrumental use of extreme
violence by terror groups and cartels to strike fear in the population and
rivals. A careful reading of Bunker makes clear he does not reject rational
choice explanations but sees deeper underlying phenomena at play in an
evolutionary or devolutionary process. This point could have been pushed
further to meld the rational choice theories with emic anthropological
perspectives on the use of dark magic violence by VSNAs.
Lisa J. Campbell’s Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, dark
magic violence case study chapter is illuminating for those seeking to
understand the role ritualized executions can have in increasing the
internal cohesion of enemy fighters. She provides useful insights such
as Islamic State continued drug use, which is non-Islamic, pushing it in
the direction of a criminal network rather than a political insurgency.
As Corcoran argues in his review of Blood Sacrifices, there is no
systematic research telling us exactly how widespread these phenomena
are, such as what percentage of criminal or insurgent organization
members engage in this activity. This level of aggregate data is vexingly
hard to obtain and, even if it were fluid, criminal networks and insurgencies are dynamic. As the various authors persuasively note, however, the
practices are evolving and even when limited, have a wider symbolic
impact upon the VSNAs and are thus worthy of study and attention.
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The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships
in Counterinsurgency
By Walter C. Ladwig III
Reviewed by Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Strategy and Policy Department, US Naval
War College

I

n The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency, Walter
Ladwig III argues that a liberal great power is more likely to coerce a
counterinsurgent government into making reforms when it makes its
support for its client conditional. Imposing tit-for-tat conditions on aid
and other types of support, Ladwig argues in this scholarly investigation,
tells the counterinsurgent government clearly that it must make the
demanded changes in its behavior if it wants to get more help.
The Forgotten Front makes the valuable and often overlooked
point that counterinsurgent governments backed by a liberal greatpower sponsor face significant domestic costs if they implement their
sponsor’s demands for reform. The interests of patron and client align
on defeating insurgency, but often little more. Reducing corruption
such as nepotism, expanding political participation, and initiating other
liberalizing reforms will deprive the host nation’s elites of the benefits
that they are fighting to protect (23). This is particularly a problem for
the host nation if it is focused on the short-term need to defeat the
insurgency quickly, Ladwig argues (34). Repression may quickly defeat
a challenge but increase violence longer term. The government’s liberal
sponsor, meanwhile, believes reforms will drive insurgent defeat and
lead to greater political stability in the longer term, though reform may
be destabilizing in the shorter term. The important related point Ladwig
also underlines is that the patron has relatively little leverage over the
client because it has already identified client survival as an important
security interest.
Ladwig focuses on how the patron can increase the likelihood of
implementing reforms to professionalize the counterinsurgent military
and increase political participation or otherwise reduce the grievances
driving the insurgency. The lavish provision of aid, he argues, is unlikely
to produce the desired changes in counterinsurgent government
behavior. He bases his argument on analysis of three US interventions,
in the Philippines against the Huk from 1947–53, in South Vietnam
from 1957–63, and in El Salvador from 1979–92. Ladwig identifies
specific US demands for reform and its behavior toward the client
(conditionality or inducement, sticks or carrots), and then evaluates
whether the counterinsurgent government complied with US demands
or not, and if so, to what degree.
His policy recommendations are sensible:
1. Expect tense relations with the client.
2. Do not fear coercing allies in crisis.
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3. Make conditions clear, measurable, and realistic.
4. Prepare for internal opposition.
5. Cultivate ties with local reformers.
This clearly written, well-researched study brings welcome attention
to counterinsurgent government interests and the client government’s
ability to resist patron pressure. Ladwig’s book fits well into mainstream
counterinsurgency studies with its assumption about the need for
reforms to defeat the insurgency but is more rigorous in its theoretical
and empirical analysis than much other work in this area.
One surprising gap is the limited reference to the work of
Douglas J. Macdonald, whose wonderfully named Adventures in Chaos:
American Intervention for Reform in the Third World makes an argument
similar to Ladwig’s. Ladwig cites Macdonald for his concept of the
commitment trap, in which a great power’s commitment to its client’s
survival reduces the great power’s leverage over that client (46). But
Macdonald, like Ladwig, finds that a tit-for-tat relationship with the
client is most effective in attaining reforms. In Macdonald’s study, the
patron increases its leverage over the client by bargaining for specific
reforms and providing support contingent upon implementation of the
previously specified actions by the client government. Macdonald, like
Ladwig, also finds unconditional commitments to the client mean less
success in coercing the client to implement reforms. The studies are not
identical, of course, though two of the authors’ cases (the Philippines
and Vietnam) are the same.
As with any scholarly work, there are limitations to the findings in
The Forgotten Front. Ladwig considers only grievance-based insurgencies
with significant popular support and those in which insurgents rely on
the populace for their existence. In addition, the study examines only
cases of US intervention during the Cold War. These scope conditions
properly raise questions about to what degree these findings may apply
to cases beyond the three studied. It is also not clear how the author
identifies and measures leverage and degrees of policy implementation.
The author also does not consider the relative cost to the client
of different reforms and different types of reforms. Ladwig notes that
military aid is of particular interest to the counterinsurgent government
but might have drawn this thread throughout his analysis (313). A
government is more likely to make policy changes that cost it relatively
less than other demanded changes, and it is more likely to make policy
changes that gain it more desirable benefits. Thus client compliance is
more likely on less costly reforms and on military reforms.
No one book can answer all questions, of course. The Forgotten
Front raises important questions for further study. The most pressing
questions involve client interests and behavior, including the relative
likelihood of client implementation of different types of reforms. Other
questions raised here likely to lead to further fruitful analysis include the
degree to which reforms are necessary for insurgent defeat, and to what
degree, if at all, symbolic reforms help defeat an insurgency (141).
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Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with
Military Training
By Carter F. Smith
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

T

he author of Gangs and the Military: Gangsters, Bikers, and Terrorists with
Military Training, Carter F. Smith, possesses a unique blend of Armygang investigative experience, primarily gained in the 1990s, and advanced
academic qualifications that provide him with a deep understanding of this
national security concern as well as many insightful perspectives related
to the area of military-trained gang members (MTGMs). On a positive
note, the work also has the endorsement of a number of well-respected
gang researchers with considerable field time under their duty belts.
With a forward by Al Valdez, a former gang unit supervisor in
Orange County, CA, and the afterward by George E. Reed, a former
Commanding Officer, US Army Criminal Investigation Command
battalion, Fort Bragg, NC, the work focuses on “the intersection of gang
life and military services” with the gangs representing violent nonstate
actors (2). As specified in the work itself, a military-trained gang member
“is defined as a member of a street gang, prison gang, outlaw motorcycle
gang, or domestic terrorist group who appears to have received military
training either directly or indirectly” (2). Chapters five and six highlight
gang activity in the military and civilian communities, respectively, and
the criminality—including numerous homicides—that such members
have engaged in.
The fact that gang members are increasingly using military-like
tactics on the streets of the United States is made clear to the reader.
The threat these individuals represent elicits the author to propose “it
would make sense to respond to gangs whose members have military
training (whether in or out of the military) as if they were insurgents”
and recommend that a counterinsurgency approach, initially focused
on intelligence gathering and analysis should be followed to contend
with them (153).
Unsurprisingly, given such concerns, the book conceptually draws
upon the third generation gangs (3 GEN Gangs) model of which John P.
Sullivan and the reviewer are proponents (21–23). This model, developed
in the later 1990s, discusses the evolution of street gangs through turf
(1st), drug (2nd), and mercenary (3rd) generations of sophistication and
how the more evolved 3 GEN Gangs—Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
Los Zetas type entities—are becoming a significant threat to domestic
security despite being a minority representation of gangs. This model is
in variance with more traditional criminological- and sociological-based
gang models, which focus on delinquency and deviance and are devoid
of any form of gang-derived national security threat potentials.
The reviewer found the work to be very well written and engaging,
with the overview on early gangs, from the seventeenth through the
mid-twentieth centuries, and their connections to the US military
quite fascinating from a historical perspective. It has been written with
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professionals, not academics, in mind which makes it more readable than
more densely written scholarly tomes. Critiques of the book are relatively
minor and focus on three primarily style and layout issues. First, the
work could benefit from a selected references section. Paging through
over 30 pages of notes to determine which works have been consulted
in the book can be rather tedious. Second, the notes section suffers
from overcitation of the works drawn upon, with full bibliographic
information then continually being provided rather than simply using
an “ibid.” Third, the use of stock photos tends to debase the value of
this unique and important work. All of these shortcomings could easily
be addressed in a second edition of the work.
The book has few, if any, equals with other works on this subject
outside of some US governmental gang reports—such as National
Gang Intelligence Center publications—or possibly Matt Kennard’s
Irregular Army, which is more of a journalistic account of gang members,
extremists, and other undesirables joining the US military after September
11, 2001. I see great value in the work for military readers as it candidly
chronicles an internal personnel issue—and metastasizing homeland
security issue—typically shunned by the services due to bad publicity.
In closing, Gangs and the Military—due to widening recognition of
this concern—should be of increasing interest to US military officers
and national security scholars well into the future. It provides them with
an understanding of how security threat groups have gained a foothold
in the armed services, the implications of their military-trained members
being unleashed on their constituent communities, and the author’s
recommendations for the military to address this issue (201–7). These
recommendations focus on providing commanders tools and options to
mitigate the emergence, existence, and effects of military-trained gang
members in their units as well as advocating a points system for agencies
to determine the gang involvement of military personnel.

Utility of War
War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat
Success into Political Victory
By Nadia Schadlow
Reviewed by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Series of the US Army Heritage
and Education Center, US Army War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2017
344 pages
$32.75

A

ll of us who teach at the US Army War College have experienced
moments of epiphany when a student makes a particularly insightful
observation. In a recent session examining stability operations, Colonel
Pat Proctor observed the Army proudly proclaims it wins the nation’s
wars, when in reality, it is not structured organizationally or intellectually
to do so. Instead the service is content just to win the nation’s battles,
and strongly resists any attempts to go beyond that role, a position
reinforced by civilian leaders reluctant to concede any role to the military
in translating battlefield success into lasting political outcomes.
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As Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively in War and the Art of
Governance only the military has the authority and resources to
accomplish that difficult task in the wake of war. Through more than a
dozen rich historical case studies, she illustrates a persistent “American
denial syndrome” that refuses to properly recognize and prepare for
the political and military challenges involved in restoring order after
combat operations. She attributes this syndrome to four main causes:
democratic discomfort with the military leading political activities, a
traditional American aversion to any taint of colonialism, a belief that
civilians should always handle governance, and a narrow military view
of its proper professional role in war reinforced by interpretations of
Carl von Clausewitz and Samuel P. Huntington.
Well versed on national security issues from her work at the Smith
Richardson Foundation, Schadlow begins her historical analysis with
General Winfield Scott’s conduct of basic reconstruction in Mexico in
1847 despite a lack of guidance from Washington. In many ways the
exercise of military governance there and in the conquered territories
marked a sort of highpoint for the practice, as the American record
over the rest of next century was usually much worse. It was only with
the establishment in 1942 of a separate Civil Affairs Division on the
General Staff and the School for Military Government at Charlottesville
that the whole issue of military governance began to gather significant
interest and adherents further motivated by the problems General
Eisenhower was confronting in North Africa. Extended occupations
in Italy, Germany, and Japan produced models of what enlightened and
empowered military governance could accomplish. More limited and
less well-prepared efforts in Korea were not as successful. Schadlow’s
analysis could have also profited from looking at the American experience
in Austria, a 10-year occupation judged also to be successful, though
Austrians claim that was despite Allied polices and not because of them.
After examining Cold War postconflict reconstructions of Korea,
the Dominican Republic, and Panama, she moves on to the rather
dismal record in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrating how the denial
syndrome undermined any chance for strategic success in both theaters
of operation from the very beginning. And again, we have failed to learn
from that experience. She points out the Defense strategic guidance for
2015 specifically states US forces will “no longer be sized to conduct
large-scale, prolonged stability operations” that are actually essential
to consolidate political gains. (274) She argues the Army must be big
enough and capable enough to accomplish necessary governance tasks
along with conventional kinetic requirements, civilian leaders must be
prepared to relinquish operational control of such reconstruction efforts,
there should be real unity of command and not competing fiefdoms, and
everyone must understand how long political consolidation will take.
This very important book should be read by soldiers and
policymakers, although the message may not be one they want to hear.
As General Buck Turgidson proclaimed in Dr. Strangelove, “The truth is
not always a pleasant thing.” But until the US government realizes, and
acts on, the necessity of reforms, the nation will be destined to continue
struggling toward any strategic gains from modern conflict, especially
in contemporary wars among the people.
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Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success
and Failure
Edited By Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason Lepore
Reviewed by John A. Bonin, Professor of Concepts and Doctrine, US Army
War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2015
352 pages
$34.38

A

ssessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure is a timely
and needed anthology. The editors—Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein,
and Jason Lepore—address a previously ignored and esoteric aspect of
national defense, military assessment, in a comprehensible manner. Two
of the editors serve in the Defense Analysis Department, US Naval Post
Graduate School. The third, Jason Lepore, is a professor of economics
at California Polytechnic State University. General George W. Casey
Jr (US Army Retired), the first commander of Multi-National Force
Iraq, provides the foreword, stating the importance of an assessment
process that anticipates challenges and identifies opportunities as well
as justifies changes. The authors include leading experts and veterans
of the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book seeks to generate
recommendations and models for future strategic assessments and to
document historical accounts of this neglected aspect of military history.
The editors seek to provide a multidimensional look at military
assessments in theory and in practice through historic and contemporary
case studies as well as through alternative dimensions. In the introduction,
the editors describe “wartime assessment” to mean the act of gathering
information to update one’s belief as to who is winning the war with
subordinate lines of effort that may include “measures of effectiveness”
and “measures of performance.”
The first section of the book expands the theoretical basis for an
assessment process. In the first chapter, Blanken and Lepore, discuss a
metrics triangle composed of benchmarks, incentives, and information,
as well as the critically important separation between a state’s political
goals and its operational benchmarks. In the next chapter, Rothstein
further analyzes this “Clauswitzian gap” and argues it is often caused by
divergence between the experiences of political and military leaders. The
final chapter of this section discusses the three primary problems with
assessments: information overload, decision making without sufficient
information, and uncertainty.
The editors tasked the authors of the nine historical chapters of the
second section to consider, what types of assessments had been made and
how they affected actors’ conduct during the war. As with any anthology,
the case studies proved somewhat uneven in both subjects and sources.
Edward Lengel’s chapter on the American Revolution effectively argues
the centrality of George Washington, his headquarters for American
military assessments, and his growth in effective decisionmaking that
resulted in victory at Yorktown. The chapter on the Seven Years’ War
in America only assesses a narrow aspect, regarding the use of proxy
forces by the British and French during the first three years. Several of
the case studies, such as those on the Civil War and the Indian Wars,
cover only singular aspects of these long and complicated conflicts.
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Brian Linn’s chapter on “Assessing the Philippine War” proved to be
one of the best in that it covers this entire, almost forgotten, successful
counterinsurgency and concluded “the assessment process . . . worked
better than could be expected” (124).
Likewise, Conrad Crane’s chapter on measuring gains in Korea
effectively argues wartime assessments of successes and failures there
shaped future US policies, and not always for the best. The chapters
covering the two world wars only provide analysis of selected aspects
of strategic assessment. Stephenson considers Falkenhayn’s belief the
French could be bled white at Verdun and the German Navy’s belief
in unrestricted submarine warfare proved to be strategic failures;
Foch’s belief that a series of coordinated allied offensives in 1918 could
achieve decisive results proved correct. Gerhard Weinburg only looks at
assessments used during two major strategic decisions in World War II:
Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion of Russia from his unrealistic
date in the fall of 1940 to his advisors preferred date in the summer of
1941 and Churchill’s controversial policy shift by the Royal Air Force to
night area-bombing of cities to prevent unacceptable losses.
The last chapter on Vietnam, and the third section, focus on more
current case studies during limited wars and counterinsurgencies. The
wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan proved difficult for the military
to assess as these included more nonmilitary factors such as political,
economic, and informational impacts on military efforts, and were
subject to the “Clauswitzian gap.” Despite practitioners’ perspectives,
not only is it too early to assess American success and failure in the latter
two conflicts accurately, but as Mark Stout tentatively presents, even
al-Qaeda does assessments.
The last section addresses alternative dimensions of assessing war.
These include a discussion of the Just War concept of proportionality;
the challenge of assessment in cyberspace; the significance of assessing
the war of ideas, or the battle of the narrative, and immature assessments
of expensive economic development efforts. Finally, the prolific author
on modern war Anthony Cordesman and Rothstein conclude the
United States must set meaningful strategic goals with appropriate
public narratives that can be assessed by suitable military assessment
organizations using realistic metrics.
Assessing War is a valuable book for serious students of strategy and
military policy and is a must for readers interested in assessing military
success. Expanded case studies that further investigate this important,
but often overlooked, aspect of military strategy and planning—assessing
how we are doing—are still needed.
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US Defense Budget Outcomes: Volatility and Predictability in
Army Weapons Funding
By Heidi Brockmann Demarest
Reviewed by Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress

I
New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017
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n defense, dollars are policy. If the nation does not spend sufficient
funds wisely on procuring the correct amount of manpower and
matérial necessary to provide for the common defense, national security
will suffer. Unfortunately, most strategic thinkers do not spend sufficient
time mastering the details of the annual defense-budget process. Instead,
most prefer to focus on the more glamorous strategic and tactical issues.
The American political system was never designed to be efficient.
Instead, it emphasizes checks and balances and popular control.
Therefore, even though the women and men of the Department of
Defense spend at least eighteen months carefully developing the annual
defense budget for the armed services and defense agencies, the entire
Congress, individual committees, or even individual members or their
staffers can and do make numerous changes to specific programs in the
proposed budget. Moreover Congress is not only becoming increasingly
involved in the details, it is taking longer and longer each year to pass
a defense budget even in a time of war. In fact, Congress has not
passed a budget on time in nine of the last ten years. Therefore, it is
more important than ever for soldiers, scholars, and practitioners to
understand the relationship between policy, strategy, and budgets.
In her new book, US Defense Budget Outcomes: Volatility and Predictability
in Army Weapons Funding, Army Major Heidi Brockmann Demarest helps
close the gap. She does this by providing an excellent analysis of how
and why certain Army procurement programs were, or were not, funded
adequately or even at all in the annual Congressional budget process in
the period after September 11, 2001.
Demarest demonstrates even though the top line for defense
only changes incrementally from year to year, or even during the
Congressional process, there is a great deal of volatility in individual
procurement programs after the budget is submitted to Congress. She
does this by examining voluminous data from 1,152 programs over
several fiscal years. She analyses how the Congress alters funding for
40 percent of the programs in the Army budget each year, and alters
two-thirds of those programs by more than 25 percent. Major Army
programs like the Crusader, the Bradley, the Striker, the Ground
Combat Vehicle, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle,
and the Future Combat System are among the programs she carefully
and comprehensively analyzes.
According to Demarest, no single factor directly accounts for this
volatility. Instead, each program’s funding history is a combination
of its technical, industrial, and political characteristics. Moreover, the
Army’s ability to influence Congress depends more on the quality of the
engagement with Congress than the quantity.
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The book also offers some important suggestions on how to
improve, clarify, and extend the discussion of the budget as it makes its
way through Congress. According to Demarest, program funding is not
incremental, no single factor explains outcomes, quality Congressional
engagements can suppress funding volatility, and an incremental strategy
may control budget outcomes for individual systems most effectively.
While many people, particularly in the executive branch,
understandably become frustrated with what they perceive as
Congressional meddling in the budget process, Demarest points out
correctly that members of Congress or congressional staffers not only
can, but should, get involved in determining how the Army and the
Pentagon spend our taxpayers’ dollars each year. These women and men
are from the most representative branch of the American government.
Those who agree or disagree with their decisions have a remedy. It is
called elections.
I have spent the majority of my professional career analyzing
defense budgets, and spent five years actually helping to formulate and
defend them. Yet, I still learned a great deal from Demarest’s book and
recommend it to all who analyze national security or become involved
in the decision-making process.
To her credit, Demarest recognizes the results she outlines can be
expanded insuring that her conclusions are not exclusively driven by a
decade of war, or whether her insights apply to the Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps as well. Based upon my own research and involvement, I
would argue that the budgets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
are not changed nearly as much by Congress as those of the Army, but
that can be the subject of her next book.
I do, however, have a minor suggestion to improve the usefulness
of the book. While Demarest has voluminous footnotes within and
references at the end of each chapter, the bibliography at the end does
not include the vast number of the references nor are many of them
included in the index.

The Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military
Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor
By William T. Johnsen
Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, author of The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for
Global War, 1934–1940

I

n the prologue of his Origins of the Grand Alliance, Professor William T.
Johnsen, of the US Army War College, tells the reader precisely what
to expect in this 256-page narrative validated by 85 pages of endnotes:
“The story told in this book is an effort to explain the origins of the
Anglo-American coalition, outline its early development, and clarify how
this early collaboration set the conditions that led to the Allied victory”
(prologue). This clear statement of intent is realized in execution so that he
can conclude “between December 1937 and December 1941 British and
American staff planners forged the foundation of the Grand Alliance.”
Historian Rick Atkinson, author of The Liberation Trilogy, highlights the
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singular importance of that alliance, calling it “the most vital American
partnership of the twentieth century.”
Scrutiny of that partnership has produced many excellent works,
but “no one treatment offers a comprehensive picture of the military
elements of the early Anglo-American process” (2). Johnsen provides
that comprehensive picture. Many earlier works begin with, and focus
on, the full-fledged staff talks in January–March 1941, the AmericanBritish Conversations known as ABC. They were “held in utmost
secrecy,” because President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned with
isolationists and noninterventionists still active in the United States
(6). Johnsen writes with authority grounded in tight organization,
thoroughness, extensive research in British and American archives and
secondary sources, and judgment shaped by his scholarship, teaching
experience, and military career.
Johnsen begins with two short chapters providing context, one on
the American-British coalition experience in the Great War and one
on the interwar years. Then, his descriptive chapter headings cue the
reader to the deepening relationship as it evolves from handholding to
marriage, which are abbreviated here and robbed of the wit found in the
original: Coalition Encounters, 1936–1939; Ties That Bind; Allocation
of War Matériel, 1939–1940; Assessing that Britain Would Survive After
the French Collapse, 1940; ABC in January–March 1941; Turning Grand
Strategy into Practical Military Plans; The State of Cooperation at the
Time of Pearl Harbor; and the Conclusion. Johnsen does a good job
sorting out what is essential to his story from what is interesting but
extraneous, focusing on coalition grand strategy. Political leaders agree
on grand strategy and provide coherent guidance to military leadership,
as poetry becomes prose.
Formulation of national strategy is a complex process; making
coalition strategy is even more complex. Then, providing military leaders
with coherent and timely guidance for implementation is problematic,
particularly when, as Johnsen and many biographers note, Roosevelt
“loathed closing any options” (238). His management style has been
characterized as divide-and-conquer with a strong preference for oral
communication that often left advisers wondering what he had really
said. His American military advisers, left in the dark, sometimes got
their guidance from British counterparts who were clearly guided by
Winston Churchill.
Unfortunately, strategy formulation does not flow textbook fashion
from national interests—in this case coalition interests—from policy
to strategy, with the latter’s component ends, ways, and means. It is a
human activity. Errors and misunderstandings abound. So do shading
of meaning and “spin” by staffers. And, sometimes in the course of
bilateral discussions and analyses, the US Navy and the Royal Navy
shared more on a specific issue than either navy shared with its own
national army or air force.
The best writing in the book is in Johnsen’s concluding chapter,
replete with wit and wisdom. He captures the special relationship of
Churchill (strategist) and Roosevelt (planner) as well as the evolution and
iteration of planning that led to victory. A “Reflection for the Future,”
his last words, are three pages on planning for coalition warfare and
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recommended for the curricula of staff schools and colleges as well as
for serious students to mull over.
Historians will forgive this reviewer’s counterfactual grace note.
What if Germany and Japan, in a grand alliance, had given priority
to defeating Russia by a coordinated offensive in 1941? Without Pearl
Harbor, the United States might have bowed to noninterventionists
as the Japanese exploited the defeat of Russia by grabbing Dutch and
French colonies. The Brits had their hands full defending the homeland,
combating German submarines in the Atlantic, and keeping open their
lines of communication through the Mediterranean to east of Suez. The
sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales and the loss of Singapore
and its garrison demonstrated by actual events that the British cupboard
was bare. That German-Japanese grand alliance would have produced a
very different future, now past.
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